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Collectivities without Intention 
 
Until relatively recently, political theory focused almost exclusively on the structure of 
decision-making and distribution of burdens among individuals in one particular relation: those 
knowingly sharing membership of a sovereign state. Alongside this, the still-dominant 
intentionalist tradition in the philosophy of social science defined collectivities (or social 
groups, which it treated as one and the same) as made up of individual members who 
considered themselves to be such. This paper will challenge this, defending a rival account of 
the circumstances under which sets of individuals constitute the kinds of collectivity with 
which political philosophers and social scientists should be concerned: the former because 
individuals are actually connected in a way giving rise to a case for collective decision-
making; the latter because an identifiable collectivity does something distinct from what its 
individual members do, survives changes in those members, and plays a necessary part in 
adequately capturing the significance of some of their individual acts. 
I have two reasons for resurrecting this topic. The first is practical: the influence we 
actually have on each other’s lives extends far beyond the units to which we see ourselves as 
belonging, from families to local schools or universities, from football clubs or political parties 
to the state. International communication, trade and travel have given rise to economic and 
legal interdependence. Between us, we have a largely detrimental impact on the natural 
environment on which we all depend. This has lately been acknowledged in political theory, in 
cosmopolitanism and the growing field of environmental justice, but it sits at odds with the 
restrictive intentionalist model of a collectivity still widely accepted in the philosophy of social 
science. Although I will not explicitly defend a “collectivity of humanity”, I hope to identify 
an expanded model which can serve as a tool for moral and political philosophers in an 
increasingly global world. 
The second reason is theoretical. Intentionalists cannot fully account even for some 
intuitively central collectivities. These include those often taken to be exemplars, the family or 
tribe, and that on which political theory has traditionally focused, the state. Intentionalists, 
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treating collectivities and social groups as the same and defining them via acknowledged 
shared goals or awareness of group membership, are unable to include certain individuals, such 
as babies and the severely mentally handicapped, as members. One leading intentionalist, 
Margaret Gilbert, attempts to do so by appeal to entry rules or imputed membership but this, I 
will argue, risks absurd consequences.1 Moreover, these being social concepts in what purports 
to be a model of the social (of social groups), Gilbert is vulnerable to a charge of circularity.  
Instead, I will disentangle the notion of a collectivity from that of a social group – social 
groups being, I contend, only a subset of the wider set of collectivities – and define the latter 
objectively, by appeal to actual mutual dependence for the satisfaction of goals, purposes or 
fundamental interests (Section 1). This model will be defended in three stages. The first 
(Sections 2-6) is to show that the non-intentionalist can account without circularity for central 
cases that intentionalists are unable to accommodate. The second (Section 7) is to 
acknowledge the inclusion of certain controversial collectivities in the non-intentionalist 
account and defend these as meeting the conditions for collectivityhood borrowed, at the close 
of my opening paragraph, from the philosophy of social science. Finally Section 8 will defend 
the model against claims that its own conditions are too strong, or that they are too weak. 
 
1. The Non-Intentionalist Model 
 
This paper will defend the following claim: 
 
A set of individuals constitutes a collectivity if and only if those individuals are 
mutually dependent for the achievement or satisfaction of some common or shared 
purpose, goal or fundamental interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. 
 
A broad understanding of “common” is at work here. The  mutual dependence clause requires 
that the individuals have goals, purposes or fundamental interests that it only makes sense to 
consider as being pursued together. This allows not only for genuinely shared goals, as with a 
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group of friends setting out to climb Monte Rosa together, but also for individual (selfish) 
goals, purposes or fundamental interests which can only be achieved together. In such cases, 
the goal is a common one because the individuals are mutually dependent for its achievement, 
rather than the other way round. Consider for example a situation similar to the start of the 
television series, Lost: a group of strangers washed up on a remote island, none of whom care 
about each other’s welfare but who need to cooperate to survive. Another way of putting this 
would be that it is collectively rational to act collectively. 
This allows for both of the following: goals, purposes or fundamental interests which by 
their nature can only be pursued together, such as the playing of a symphony by an orchestra, 
and those which in the circumstances can only be pursued together, for example the keeping 
clean of a vast mansion. The group includes all and only those who are thus mutually 
dependent. It would be arbitrary to include some but not all of the friends on their 
mountaineering expedition or all of the London Symphony Orchestra save one flautist. 
There are several distinctions within this account. Collectivities can be pre-existing or new. 
Compare a village school with a few parents setting up a fundraising committee. They can be 
lasting or ad hoc: constituted by individuals who are mutually dependent through a very short-
term goal, purpose or interest. Paul Sheehy provides an example of the latter: four prisoners 
escaping in a rowing boat.2 Collectivities can be small or large, voluntary or involuntary, 
passive or active, or can overlap categories. Fathers for Justice is a small, voluntary, active 
subset of the large, partially involuntary collectivity of divorced fathers unhappy with their 
legal access entitlements, mutually dependent in the sense that the goal (legal change) is one 
that, if achieved for any, must be achieved for all. They can be entirely intentional (the 
fundraising parents) or only partially intentional (the family or state). Most controversially, 
they might be entirely unintentional, a possibility to which I will return in Section 7. 
Some but not all collectivities are social groups: a village cricket side is; Sheehy’s escaping 
prisoners are not.3 Since the aim of this paper is to expand the notion of a collectivity, as a unit 
with which political philosophers and social scientists should concern themselves, I will not 
examine in detail the notion of the social. Instead, I will work with a rough specification of a 
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social property, as having significance over and above the material or physical properties with 
which it coincides, because of the recognition by a certain group of people that it will have it. 
It is then possible, Section 6 will suggest, to identify social groups as sets of individuals who 
constitute collectivities only because of some social fact. 
Finally, a brief disclaimer: in arguing, like Carol Gould, that collectivities are constituted 
by “individuals-in-relations”, my model lends itself to her intermediate position, or that 
defended by Alan Carter, on the spectrum between ontological holism and ontological 
individualism (although Gould and I disagree on what those relations must be).4 However, this 
paper does not purport explicitly to justify such a stance. Rather, it engages with the vexed 
ontological question only to the extent that it defends the expressive autonomy of 
collectivities: the claim that, in referring to collectivities, we are able to state truths we would 
otherwise be unable to express.5  
 
2. The Limits of Intentionalism 
 
The first stage of the defence of the non-intentionalist model is a critique of intentionalism as 
too restrictive. In referring to “intentionalists”, I take myself as engaging with theorists 
including but not limited to Gilbert, Christopher Kutz and, at least in some of her work, 
Gould.6 The intentionalist position can be expressed broadly as the claim that a set of 
individuals constitutes a collectivity only if each considers herself to be part of a group with 
the others, or only if all jointly intend to do something. Perhaps the narrowest intentionalist 
view, corresponding to Gilbert’s plural subject model, is the following:7 
 
A collectivity is a set or aggregate of individuals with at least one shared purpose or 
goal, all of whom are aware of that goal or purpose, aware that it is shared, aware of the 
awareness of other members of this, aware of each member’s joint readiness to commit 
to achieving the joint goal or purpose as a body, aware of each member’s awareness of 
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this (and so on). 
 
Call this the Narrow Intentionalist Thesis (NIT). “Purpose” is understood as including 
commitment to beliefs or values, in the sense of intention to modify one’s behaviour to some 
extent in accordance with them.  
I will reject the intentionalist theses on the grounds that they exclude some individuals 
intuitively regarded as members of central collectivities, who are not or cannot be aware of a 
shared purpose or goal, do not or cannot consider themselves as being part of a group, and do 
not or cannot jointly intend to do anything. 
Firstly, however, it is worth clarifying that intentionalists need not adhere to the still more 
controversial idea (implicit in the NIT) that membership must be voluntary. Given the 
centrality of those collectivities (families, states) of which we find ourselves a part without 
choosing to be, this would be highly problematic. Although Gilbert originally defines joint 
readiness so as to appear to require voluntary participation, Gould, Kutz and Gilbert herself in 
later work distinguish between that which is intentionally done and that which is voluntarily 
chosen or even intended by the individuals concerned: someone can agree, or express 
readiness, to do something even under coercion. 8  
Thus, the NIT can be stripped of reliance on voluntariness without threatening the core 
intentionalist viewpoint. Awareness, however, is central: awareness of being part of a group, 
intending to do something jointly, or intentionally pursuing shared ends. And it is precisely 
this requirement that is challenged by the following three special cases. The discussion is in 
terms of the family, but could also be formulated in terms of tribes or even states. In breaking 
down the NIT in an attempt to accommodate such cases, I will demonstrate not only its 
inability to include them, but also that of the intentionalist theses more broadly expressed. 
The first special case is the baby. Families are central collectivities. Babies, intuitively, are 
members of families. The rest of the family considers them to be so and treats them as 
members; they are tied to one another through the ongoing routine of family life, on which 
they all, including the infant, depend. The infant, although he can hardly be said to have goals, 
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has interests the satisfaction of which depends on that ongoing interaction. Moreover, it is a 
part of the rest of the family’s goal that those interests be satisfied. However, babies are not 
aware of being part of a collectivity. They cannot participate in any joint intention. They are 
not aware of all the various things a family does together.  
The NIT might be adapted to accommodate infants by requiring that, if they are not 
currently aware of the goals or purposes and their being shared, members will at least become 
so. However, this (itself a significant amendment) would not accommodate the next 
problematic case: the severely mentally handicapped person. One response would be to require 
that all individuals within the set who can be aware of the goals or purposes (aware that they 
are shared, etc) will be so aware, but that there may be some who are not so able. But even 
this, which goes further still from the core idea of the intentionalist account, remains 
problematic. As with the baby, although he has interests, it is doubtful whether the severely 
mentally handicapped person can have (and so share in) goals or purposes, at all; unlike with 
the baby, it is sadly unlikely that she will ever be able to form them. Moreover, this change 
would leave untouched the third problematic case: the teenage rebel.9 
The rebel is not a baby, nor is he mentally handicapped. He would deny being part of the 
family and resent any demands made on him by other members. However, his parents think he 
is part of the family and theirs seems a reasonable conviction given the many ways in which 
their lives are intertwined. We might helpfully consider two variants of this case. In the first, 
the teenager espouses the goal of living a comfortable and secure life and continues to reap the 
advantages of being in the family home whilst refusing to acknowledge his reliance on his 
family or to consider himself in any way committed to the goal also of furthering their comfort 
and security. In the second, he denies that he has any need for the kind of security provided in 
his parents’ house (food on the table, a welcoming home, educational opportunities, 
reassurance and conversation, and so on), which he dismisses as bourgeois. 
There is interdependence in these cases: the rebel’s family members are not mistaken. 
However, there is no joint commitment to a shared goal. To accommodate the rebel, the NIT 
would have to be amended yet again, allowing for members of a collectivity who could be 
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aware of the common goal, purpose or interest (aware that it is a common goal, purpose or 
interest) but deny this. In the first case, the rebel acknowledges a goal or interest but 
mistakenly denies the mutual dependence that requires that it be pursued as a common goal; in 
the second case he denies the interest.  
In altering the NIT to accommodate these cases, I have stripped it of its intentionalism. To 
attempt a parallel revision of the broader theses would be immediately to beg the question. It 
seems completely unhelpful to define a collectivity as “a set of individuals who jointly intend 
to do something or regard themselves as part of a group and some who cannot and some who 
could but do not”. An account would immediately be owed of which of all the many other 
people in the world are to be included in that “some” and this, I contend, cannot be provided 
within the intentionalist framework. To avoid being so weak as to be completely open-ended, 
such an account would have to include some more objective criteria – to appeal, in other 
words, to exactly the kind of actual interdependence highlighted by the non-intentionalist 
model.  
To elaborate on these points, I will consider the attempt of one leading intentionalist, 
Gilbert, to accommodate at least some complex cases within her intentionalist model. I will 
reject it on several grounds, including circularity. Sections 4, 5 and 6 will show that the non-
intentionalist can include such cases, without circularity. 
 
3. Entry Rules, Imputed Membership and Circularity 
 
Gilbert does not want to exclude the baby from membership of social groups, and offers two 
strategies to avoid this. The first is via entry rules.  
 
[A] plural subject… may have a sense of need for new members… [T]he existing members 
may establish rules that determine who may become a member. The possibility of such entry 
rules allows for complex cases. The rules can in principle be so capacious as to allow those 
lacking the ability to be members of the initial plural subject to be considered members none 
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the less. Thus infants can be thought of as ‘members of the tribe’, though they have no 
conception of the tribe as a whole.10 
  
Her later suggestion, focusing on political societies, is that infants can be assigned imputed 
membership as a kind of stop gap until full membership can be achieved. 
 
[Core members] may stipulate that others, for instance, their children, are to be regarded as 
members for some or all practical purposes. These others then have imputed membership. They 
will not be core members or members proper unless they come to participate in the joint 
commitment that constitutes the political society in question.11 
 
Both suggestions face an obvious problem: it is unclear what limits there are on rule-setting 
or stipulation. As it stands, the first quote suggests that anyone can become a member of a 
collectivity simply because the individuals who make up its intentional core decree her to be 
so. Such a view is not unheard-of in actual collectivities: according to the Roman Catholic 
Church, being baptised, even as an infant, constitutes the formation of an “ontological and 
permanent bond, which is not lost by reason of any act or fact of defection”12. However, it 
would be uncharitable to interpret Gilbert as espousing it, for it has absurd implications.  
For example, two of my young cousins are besotted with Twilight star Edward Cullen. 
Suppose they set up a fan club, feel a “sense of need for new members”, and establish entry 
rules such that all of their first cousins count as members. My sister and I would become 
members of a collectivity without knowing it or wanting to be. Gilbert’s second strategy, 
restricting core members’ authority to stipulating imputed or “secondary” membership, would 
prevent us unwittingly becoming full members.13 However, my cousins could still count us as 
members “for all practical purposes”.  
Moreover, this modification comes at a price: even if infants might be generally expected to 
progress to full membership, severely mentally handicapped individuals could only ever be 
imputed members of the societies, families or tribes into which they were born. I find this 
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repugnant: quite apart from the possible practical implications, it suggests that such 
membership is not something to which they are entitled, but is extended to them (or not) at the 
discretion of intentional members. However, I will not rest my rejection of Gilbert’s argument 
on this intuition, which is not universally shared.14 Rather, I focus on the absurd implications 
of unlimited authority even to assign imputed membership, and the impossibility of curtailing 
it convincingly without appeal to objective criteria. 
To avoid the counterexample above, entry rules or imputed membership might be read as 
applicable only to those who are cognitively incapable of participating in the relevant joint 
intention and so could not otherwise become members of the group. However, the position 
would remain problematic, for three reasons.  
Firstly, even if core members must limit their stipulations to those incapable of forming 
joint intentions and even if only imputed membership is assigned, their powers remain 
absurdly open ended. While my cousins could not include my sister and me in their Cullen fan 
club, they could stipulate that my baby nephew count as a member “for all practical purposes”. 
In practice, moreover, such assignment of membership can have frightening consequences: 
consider the fate of Italian Jewish children after the Counter-Reformation, who were secretly 
or forcibly baptised as Catholics and separated from non-converting parents.15 What is needed 
is not unqualified authority for core members, but a way of identifying those others who, in 
each case, they are entitled to consider as belonging to the same collectivity. 
Presumably, for Gilbert, the relevant difference between the ludicrous stipulation of 
membership of the fan club and cases such as parents assigning their baby imputed 
membership of the family, is that the child can be expected later to commit to the latter 
collectivity, but not the former. To make this a condition, however, simply pushes back the 
question. Under what circumstances can the core members reasonably expect this? (Their 
actually expecting it is not enough: they might be delusional.) Criteria external to the wants 
and beliefs of core members are needed, whether in terms of biological relationships (which 
seems too restrictive: consider adoptive families, for example) or actual interdependence.  
The second difficulty concerns the teenage rebel, who is excluded from the model by 
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precisely the restriction used, above, to save Gilbert from some of her most far-fetched 
implications. If even imputed membership cannot be assigned to those who could commit to 
the common goals or purposes of a collectivity and who might (based on lives actually 
interconnected) reasonably be expected to do so, but do not, then the teenage rebel can never 
even be an imputed member of his own family. If, however, the account of imputed 
membership (or entry rules) were interpreted as including such cases, more objective criteria 
would once again be required. What allows the inclusion of the rebel in the family but prevents 
my young cousins from making me an imputed member of their Cullen fan club?  
Thus, we are no closer to understanding how an intentionalist model could accommodate 
non-intentional members of collectivities without introducing objective membership criteria. A 
third problem with such “add-on” rules is that they leave the intentionalist vulnerable to 
accusations of circularity. Gilbert, recall, takes collectivities and social groups to be 
synonymous. Hers, like many intentionalist models, is intended as an account not only of the 
circumstances under which we form collectivities but also of the realm of the social, in terms 
of the thoughts and beliefs of individuals. However, as Section 6 will bring out, entry rules and 
imputed membership are themselves social concepts. They would permit certain individuals to 
count as part of a social group precisely because they are recognised as such by those already 
in it. Accordingly, to introduce them at this stage in the argument, without their own analysis 
in terms of collective ideas, is to rely on the very idea that is being defined.16  
 
4. Non-Intentionalism , Complex Cases and Human Interests 
 
Faced with three difficult but intuitively central cases, I have rejected the broad intentionalist 
theses and am left with an NIT so pared down so as no longer to live up to its middle initial. 
That is, with the idea of a collectivity as a number of individuals mutually dependent for either 
the achievement of a consciously shared goal or purpose or the securing for each of some 
individual selfish goal or human interest, not all of whom can or not acknowledge that 
dependence. In other words, we have almost exactly the definition in Section 1: a set of 
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individuals mutually dependent for the achievement or satisfaction of some common or shared 
purpose, goal or fundamental interest whether or not they acknowledge it themselves.  
This accommodates all three special cases as members of families (or tribes), as follows 
obviously from points made in Section 2. The baby is mutually dependent with his parents and 
siblings for the achievement of the goals of family life (broadly, living peacefully and happily 
together). Of course, the baby does not have goals: he cannot formulate them. Moreover, the 
conscious, practical pursuit of common ends will be done by the others. However, the 
dependence is mutual because not only is it part of their shared aims that the baby be included 
(and is healthy and contented), but this positive family atmosphere is in his interest. The same 
argument can be offered for the severely mentally handicapped family member. The rebel is 
also tied to his family in various ways. He inhabits the same house and they all, including him, 
benefit from a supportive family atmosphere. There are common interests in play, fundamental 
interests in a stable family life, which can only be met together. In the first variant, he 
acknowledges some of these as selfish interests whilst mistakenly denying the mutual 
dependence for their achievement; in the second, he denies them even as interests. 
The incorporation of interests into the model is no ad hoc manoeuvre. Rather, it is essential 
to avoiding the difficulty of explaining which non-intentional individuals – babies, mentally-
handicapped persons, or indeed rebels – can be considered members of a collectivity without 
leaving it entirely to the (often dubious) discretion of some intentional “core”. They are 
members, on this model, because of their actual mutual dependence through interests. By 
contrast, my cousins cannot arbitrarily set rules to include my sister and me, or my nephew, in 
their fan club. Not only do we not share their goal: we do not have an interest in admiring 
Edward Cullen (let alone one which could only be satisfied by cooperation with them). 
In making this move, however, I have to acknowledge the limitations of the current paper. 
Any reference to “interests” prompts a call for further clarification and defence. What counts 
as the kind of interest on which collectivityhood can be based? To anticipate Section 8, 
interpreting this too broadly would make the model too inclusive. However, it is possible to 
distinguish between cases of mutual dependence for the guarantee of fundamentally important 
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interests and those where only trivial interests (say, in having access to a particular fashion 
store) are at stake. What is salient about the cases just considered – the family including any of 
the complex case individuals – is that the interests in question are fundamental human 
interests. To clarify, it is to these that the non-intentionalist model is restricted. 
This, in turn, presents further challenges: a plausible account is required of human interests 
which not only picks some out as fundamental but also, as in the second teenage rebel 
example, goes beyond what even an individual capable of forming goals espouses as such. I 
claim neither to provide such a model nor that it would be uncontroversial to do so, and to this 
extent my arguments remain conditional. I would note, however, that there is a well-
documented mismatch between the achievement of individual goals and preferences and a 
flourishing human life.17 Rival accounts of human interests, which are more objective without 
being unacceptably paternalistic, are philosophically available.  
In particular, the idea can be borrowed from some versions of the capabilities approach that 
flourishing requires a genuine opportunity to exercise certain broadly defined functions: as 
Amartya Sen puts it, “the capabilities to choose a life one has reason to value”.18 Such core 
functions would include life, health, bodily integrity, practical reason and affiliation.19 If 
deprivation of a central capability undermines a person’s ability fully to flourish, then there are 
some fundamental human interests: interests in retaining those central capabilities, many of 
which (health, life, affiliation) the infant or the mentally handicapped individual could also 
enjoy, and which are not reducible to the goals or preferences of any individual.20 
 
5. The State as Collectivity 
 
The non-intentionalist model can also accommodate the state as a collectivity. Some might 
query whether it needs, for philosophical consistency, to do so: the state could rather be 
viewed more narrowly as a set of institutions which regulate the lives of individuals and of 
groups. However, it must be admitted as advantageous if it can. Political philosophy tends to 
treat this as the central collectivity, or decision-making locus, and to anticipate a discussion 
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beyond the limits of this paper, it would be interesting and helpful if political obligations could 
be explained via more general consideration of the obligations of membership of certain types 
of collectivity.21 Indeed, it is precisely through such generalised discussion, rather than 
unquestioning allegiance to the idea that there is something special about the state, that the 
sphere might be broadened of those to whom such obligations are owed.  
The problem for the intentionalist is that, quite apart from those individuals who cannot  
form a joint commitment, it is impossible to identify a genuinely shared goal or purpose 
espoused in (say) Spain by those capable of espousing it. A first suggestion would be that the 
common goals are the many things the Spanish want to achieve as a country, from winning the 
World Cup to defending themselves, if necessary, against enemy attack. However, various 
individuals within Spain will not uphold such goals. For example, those with Brazilian parents 
or grandparents might support a rival football team. This would not be a problem so long as 
there were some shared goals or purposes at the state level. After all, there are many 
collectivities within a state, including cultural subgroups, each with its own goals or purposes. 
The real difficulty, however, is that some individuals are not committed to even the most 
general ends, such as defending Spain against attack. Consider extremist Basque separatists 
who do not regard themselves as part of Spain at all and actively work against the national 
government.  
The non-intentionalist can accommodate such individuals by reference to a common 
interest. Those within a state are mutually dependent through its institutional framework. No 
matter how little they care about one another, the central capabilities each needs to live a 
flourishing life can, under the circumstances, only be secured together.  
This should not be taken as implying either of two implausible claims.22 The first is that all 
actions of state institutions, including all systems of redistributive taxation, actually make 
things better for everyone.23 Rather, the point is that having been born into the same state, we 
are dependent on it, and so ultimately on each other, for the security of such fundamental 
interests as life, health, bodily integrity and the opportunity to engage in meaningful planning 
of our own life. Even if the separatist would see these permanently unsatisfied rather than 
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accept the authority of the Spanish state, they are nonetheless interests of his which depend for 
fulfilment on some level of cooperation with those with whom he happens to share that state.  
That is not to say – the second implausible claim – that any means of resolving the conflict, 
long term, must be in the all-things-considered interest of each of those caught up in it: for 
example, that the continuance of the state as it is makes the separatist’s life better overall. 
Given his conception of the good, this is implausible. But even if different solutions are more 
or less to the advantage of different individuals – even if the ultimate outcome is the separation 
into two states, and two collectivities – the current mutual dependence remains a fact: mutual 
dependence, among other things, through the need each has to find some workable solution. 
 
Thus, the non-intentionalist model withstands the charge levelled at the intentionalists: their 
inability to accommodate non-intentional members of intuitively and practically central 
collectivities. The next section will argue that it is able to do so without circularity. 
 
6. Social Groups, Aggregates and Collectivities 
 
This section will outline the distinctions between social groups and collectivities in general, 
and between collectivities and aggregates. This is partly to explain how the non-intentionalist 
model avoids circularity but also to emphasise a broader point: as well as accounting better 
than the intentionalist for some central social groups, the model highlights a wider set of 
collectivities that neither political philosophers nor social scientists can afford to ignore. 
An aggregate is a set of individuals sharing some property, for example having blond hair. 
A collectivity, by contrast, is made up of individuals who are actually mutually dependent in 
the sense their goals, purposes or fundamental interests can only be satisfied together. Some 
aggregates will also be collectivities, but only where possession of the shared property gives 
rise to (or follows from) some common goal, purpose or fundamental interest. Thus blind 
people in the UK might constitute a collectivity because the structural provisions necessary for 
each to live as full a life as possible will be achievable only for all of them, and cannot be 
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secured by any in isolation. This does not apply, however, to those with blond hair. 
With regard to social properties, without space or necessity to enumerate the many 
available philosophical accounts, I will simply draw on clear cut cases of their being true of 
someone or something – David Cameron is the British Prime Minister; England won the 
Ashes; a piece of plastic in my bag is a university staff card – to draft a necessary criterion so 
general as to be uncontroversial.24  
 
It is a necessary condition of a property’s being a social property that it has significance 
over and above the material or physical properties with which it coincides, and has this 
because of the recognition by a certain group of individuals that it will have it. 
 
I am trying to capture the idea of a general understanding that doing such-and-such a thing will 
count as doing x.25 
With this framework, the distinction can be brought out between social groups, social 
aggregates and non-social collectivities. The “significance” highlighted above is integral to 
some collectivities, and these collectivities are also social groups. This can arise in two ways, 
because of the two interpretations of “common” end, in Section 1. The first, on which 
intentionalists focus, involves a genuinely shared goal, as with the friends climbing Monte 
Rosa. In such cases, there is an additional significance to the goal’s being achieved by them 
together, over and above its being achieved for each of them, precisely because those 
individuals count this as a particular kind of achievement. It is important to each that they all 
reach the summit and that they support each other in various ways to do so.  
In the second case, action has to be taken by a number of individuals to secure some 
individual interest, purpose or goal each has, even if each individual is indifferent as to 
whether the others achieve their ends. Then, there might be a social component to the 
constitution of the collectivity: it might be because of social properties true of each of the 
individuals (say, their being members of the same social class) that they are mutually 
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dependent in this way. Alternatively, the goals requiring common achievement might involve a 
social property becoming true of some individual, group or material object. For example, 
individuals from different communities across a city might need to cooperate to promote the 
election of an official whom all wish to see in power.  
Building on this discussion, social groups can be identified as follows. 
 
A set of individuals constitute a social group if and only if they constitute a collectivity 
and: either, it is because of at least one social property true of the individuals that they 
are mutual dependent for the achievement or satisfaction of the common goal, purpose 
or fundamental interest, or it is an integral part of that common goal, purpose or 
fundamental interest that at least one social property becomes or remains true of 
someone, some set of individuals, or some thing. 
 
Not all sets of individuals who share some social property count as social groups, because 
they do not all count as collectivities. As with sharing physical properties, there is no reason 
why this should render a set of individuals a collectivity unless that property ties its holders in 
some further way. For example, it is probable that there are many individuals across the world 
with the social property of being entitled to a Spanish passport (for example by virtue of a 
parent who emigrated at an early age) but consider themselves, and are, in no way specially 
tied to Spain. They are unconcerned about its World Cup performance and upset by terrorist 
attacks on Madrid no more than by such attacks anywhere else. Nor, because they have never 
actually lived in Spain, are they mutually dependent through fundamental interests. Like those 
with blond hair, this set of the nominally “Spanish” constitutes only an aggregate – in this case 
a social aggregate – and not a collectivity. 
Moreover, not all collectivities are social groups: the Lost collectivity from Section 1 is not; 
nor are Sheehy’s prisoners. Further examples will follow in Section 7. In such cases the mutual 
dependence neither results from social factors nor adheres to a common end which is 
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irreducibly social. Political philosophers and social scientists should not limit their attention to 
the narrower set. Rather, as I will argue, identifying collectivities – all collectivities – rather 
than mere aggregates allows us to express new truths about certain situations in which 
individuals actually find themselves: sets of relations within which individual acts have a 
peculiarly collective significance and within which there is at least a prudential case for 
developing a framework for collective action.  
This theoretical apparatus allows the non-intentionalist to accommodate the state, as a 
collectivity and a social group, without circularity. Intentionalists aim to define collectivities, 
taken to be the same thing as social groups, in terms of the beliefs of individuals. As we saw in 
Section 3, they must then risk circularity in introducing social concepts, such as entry rules, to 
accommodate non-intentional members. On the non-intentionalist model, there is no such 
problem because the definition is of a collectivity, which is not a social concept and is 
objectively defined. Because the mutual dependence between individuals within the state 
arises as a result of historical social arrangements, they constitute a social group as well as a 
collectivity. But, regardless of the status of (say) “being Spanish” as a social property, a person 
born in Spain finds herself, as a matter of fact, in relations of mutual dependence through 
fundamental interests with all those with whom she actually shares her country. That is, she is 
a member of that collectivity. Thus, the account avoids circularity. 
 
7. Controversial Collectivities 
 
As well as accommodating intuitively central collectivities better than the intentionalist, the 
non-intentionalist model allows for collectivities within which no members consider 
themselves part of a group, jointly intend to do anything, or acknowledge common goals or 
purposes.26 This section defends this, arguing that even such controversial non-intentionalist 
collectivities meet three conditions against which candidates for collectivityhood might 
reasonably be judged.27 The first is that the significance of certain individual actions cannot be 
 18 
captured without reference to the collectivity as a whole. The second is that what the 
collectivity does is distinct from what the individuals do. The third is that lasting (as opposed 
to ad hoc) collectivities persist even as individual members leave and are replaced. I will 
consider these in turn and then expand with reference to three controversial examples.  
The first condition has two elements: “significance” and “ineliminability”. There is an 
additional significance to certain individual acts in any non-intentionalist collectivity, not 
necessarily in the social sense of significance assigned by some group but because they 
contribute to a wider effect which, because of the relations in which the individuals stand, has 
a specific kind of impact on precisely those individuals. The relevant relations are those that 
render the set of individuals a collectivity. They are mutually dependent for the achievement of 
certain purposes, goals or fundamental interests: those ends, “common” in either of the two 
senses identified in Section 1, can only be achieved, for each individual, by the set as a whole.  
This significance is “ineliminable” in that reference to collectivities enables us to state 
truths we would otherwise be unable to express: the collectivity has expressive or descriptive 
autonomy.28 To parallel an argument once offered by Graham Macdonald and Philip Pettit, 
some statements of fact, such as “the collectivity has lost three members” or “the losing team 
regrouped”, cannot be expressed by reference only to individuals. That is not to say that 
collective-level changes can occur without any individual level change (this would be to deny 
supervenience); rather, there is an open-ended list of possible combinations of individual 
changes, each of which could have brought about the collective change. It is impossible to 
identify even a lengthy disjunction of individual predicates for any one collective predicate.29 
(This is known as the multiple realisations argument.) 
Regarding the second condition, two situations can be identified: those where it is 
impossible (by definition) for individuals to do what the collectivity does and those where 
individuals are merely physically unable to do so. Only the US electorate could elect Barack 
Obama president; individuals could only vote for him. A crew sails a large ship: something an 
individual sailor could not physically achieve.30 In all cases, however, collectivities “do” or 
achieve something distinct from what their individual members do. 
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At first glance, the final condition faces difficulties when it comes to small collectivities. 
For example, the removal of one person from a couple seems to put an end to that collectivity. 
Would a collectivity composed of three friends survive if one left? However, these concerns 
can be rejected as obstacles to the non-intentionalist account. With the couple example, one 
person alone cannot generally be a collectivity. Morever, some very small groups can sustain 
some changeover. A family is still a family when an extra child is born or one parent dies. A 
small friendship group could sometimes persist if one member was replaced (compare the 
turnover within a three-member pop band such as the Sugarbabes). We can accommodate this 
by allowing for borderline cases.31 Note also that the cases discussed here are intentionalist 
collectivities: if this is a problem, it is also a problem for the intentionalist. 
To reinforce these points, we can apply the three conditions to three controversial 
examples. The first is the owners of second homes set round a village green. By picking a 
commuter village, with no history of community feeling, we can assume that the owners do not 
consider themselves part of a group. Each wants the green to be pleasant but only because this 
meets his individual requirements. To make it more strongly non-intentional, assume that, due 
to other commitments, each owner uses his second home on different days each fortnight. 
None even knows whether any of the others uses the green. However, because they all do, they 
can only keep it so by de facto cooperation. Each one (say, by dropping litter) could undermine 
the project. Thus, they count as a non-intentional collectivity. 
Indefinitely many different combinations of individual action could secure the common 
end. Some individuals might pick up litter while others only refrain from spreading it, or vice 
versa; one person might put out food to encourage birdlife, another refrain from wearing his 
spiked boots to play football, or vice versa. It is true that each individual acts in this way 
because he wants to keep the green pleasant for himself but, because of their actual if 
unacknowledged relations, their acts only lead to the satisfaction of the goals in combination. 
The significance of their behaviour can only fully be captured once it is seen in this context, 
i.e. by reference to the collectivity. To put it another way (and satisfy the second condition), it 
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is this identifiable collectivity, rather than individuals in isolation, which keeps the green 
pleasant and tidy. The third condition is satisfied because individual houses could be sold and, 
assuming the new owners also want a pleasant green, the collectivity would persist.  
Secondly, suppose four young men, members of deeply opposed gangs in their home city, 
are cast up on an island. In this Lost-The Wire hybrid, cooperation to find food, build shelter, 
and so on, is needed for each to survive. However, such is their mutual loathing that they deny 
any such idea and would rather spend their time on the island attempting to kill each other. 
They constitute an involuntary, unintentional collectivity.  
There is a significance to each individual’s action – a significance for him and precisely 
those others – which can only be brought out by reference to his being in a collectivity. In 
fighting the others, each is contributing to a situation in which his own interests are 
undermined. Moreover, the outcome (disaster or cooperation) could come about in innumerable 
ways. Whether x strikes y and z retaliates, or y attacks z and w runs off with the food, or another 
combination, the collective-level outcome is the same: tragedy. This is not a coincidental 
aggregation of individual acts, but the result of the combined of acts of individuals – who are, 
but needn’t have been, those particular individuals – within certain sets of relations. Thus, it is 
not each individual or simply the individuals in aggregate, but the collectivity constituted by 
individuals in those particular relations, that brings about this catastrophe. Finally, y and z 
could build a raft and leave, and members of rival gangs be washed ashore, without threatening 
the persistence of the collectivity. 
The third example, borrowed from Graham, is the most controversial.  
 
A pack of hyenas can coordinate in very subtle ways in collectively stalking and killing a lion. 
Though it may be presumed that they have intentions in doing so, they do not have the linguistic 
apparatus necessary for being aware of the intentions they have, and so a fortiori they are not 
aware of any such intentions being collective ones.32 
 
Indefinitely many different combinations of individual actions can lead to the group result: 
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one hyena might grab the lion and three others stop it from escaping, or the other way around, 
or some entirely different combination. In none of these scenarios does an individual hyena 
achieve the goal (kill the lion) except as one of a number of coordinating actors. In this sense, 
the significance of each act is only captured by ineliminable reference to the collectivity, 
which can also be said to have hunted the lion. Finally, individual hyenas could drop out and 
others join the hunt without affecting the survival of the collectivity. Thus, the non-
intentionalist model can be extended to include nonhumans. 
This concludes the second element of the defence of the non-intentionalist model. One final 
point is worth stressing. Some collectivities – those such as Sheehy’s prisoners that I have 
dubbed ad hoc – will not satisfy the third condition. However, lasting collectivities will; it is 
these that are of particular interest to practical philosophers and social scientists. 
 
8. Objections 
 
This section will reject two obvious, if conflicting, objections to the non-intentionalist model: 
that its conditions for collectivityhood are too weak, and that they are too strong. I will begin 
with the latter, according to which it is unnecessary to require mutual dependence of all 
members on all other members. Consider the state. Surely, the objector points out, everyone in 
the state can get along very well without everyone paying taxes, so long as enough people do 
so to support the health, security and education institutions?  
The response to this is twofold, corresponding to two distinct scenarios. On the first, I have 
already noted the possibility of passive collectivities, or collectivities of which only a subset is 
active. Section 1 referred to Fathers For Justice, a subset of those divorced or separated fathers 
who would like to see changes to the law. Another example is those suffragettes seeking 
suffrage for all women as an active subset of the largely passive collectivity of women. In such 
cases, the goal, by its nature, would be achieved for all if achieved for any. This could be 
because it is a genuinely shared goal (for example, if all women genuinely espoused the goal 
that all women should have the vote) or simply because of the nature of the end sought (votes 
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for all women means votes for you if you are a woman, and it is in each woman’s interest to 
have a vote). The mutual dependence clause is met because each individual’s achieving her 
goal (or fundamental interest) depends on the others achieving theirs, and this is true even if 
the positive effort is put in by only the active subset. 
The second scenario concerns goals or interests which do not by their nature need to be 
achieved by all for all, but do under the circumstances. Then, membership of the collectivity is 
contingent both on individuals having the fundamental interest, goal or purpose and on 
cooperation being required for its achievement. The state falls into this category. However, the 
objection can be rejected as narrowing down unnecessarily the ways in which an individual 
could cooperate. Omissions, as well as actions, can count. Thus, in the state, not everyone has 
to pay taxes for a peaceful, secure environment to be provided for all. However, satisfaction of 
common interests does require everyone to refrain from bombing government buildings or 
public places, poisoning the drinking water, and so on. Given modern technology, even one 
individual could cause general devastation. 
This leaves the converse objection: that including as a collectivity any set of individuals 
who would benefit from cooperating, in terms of an interest or goal each has, renders the 
model implausibly weak. For example, you and I would both benefit from being fitter and 
running together would help us to do so. But to consider us a collectivity with the common end 
of running together would be counterintuitive if we have no wish or intention actually to do so.  
This objection misrepresents the model, in that it glosses over a distinction between mutual 
dependence and the weaker condition of potential mutual advantage. According to the 
understanding of mutual dependence incorporated in the non-intentionalist account, a set of 
individuals do not constitute a collectivity unless they are in one of the following three 
situations. The first is that the individuals have an acknowledged shared goal in the simplest 
sense of wanting to achieve some particular end together, as with the friends on Monte Rosa.  
Secondly, a set of individuals could constitute a collectivity without an acknowledged 
shared goal, if cooperation is required for the achievement of each one’s individual goals or 
purposes. Suppose several climbers have, independently, got half way up Monte Rosa. The 
 23 
weather has turned and each wants to get down, but this would require them to rope together 
and use all the equipment they have between them. Because of the situation, they constitute a 
collectivity even if none cares about getting down together. This can be distinguished from the 
case in which each could get down alone but it might be pleasanter (or faster) to combine 
forces. Then, there would be potential for mutual advantage but, unless all choose to adopt the 
new shared goal (getting down together), they would not constitute a collectivity. 
The third possibility is that cooperation is required to satisfy each individual’s fundamental 
interest. Recalling Section 4, this is not the same as hinging collectivityhood on each having an 
interest in something that would require cooperation for its satisfaction. Robert Nozick might 
have an interest in a public address system, the achievement of which would require 
cooperation with his neighbours, but this is not enough to render him and them a collectivity.33 
The interest is a trivial one, overridden by other goals and interests. However, the point 
borrowed from the capabilities approach was that there are some things of fundamental 
importance to any human life (such as a secure opportunity for health or bodily integrity), no 
matter what that individual’s preferences are. Only if there is mutual dependence for the 
satisfaction of such a fundamental interest can a collectivity can be constituted where there is 
neither a genuinely common goal nor mutual dependence for the achievement of 
acknowledged individual goals.  
Suppose not all the climbers want to retreat: some want to go on up to the summit despite 
the changed conditions. Then, they constitute a collectivity only if: a) their lives or other 
fundamental interests are at stake if they don’t retreat, and b) the situation is as described 
above, so that none has the equipment or expertise to get down alone, but all could do so if 
they cooperated. If the risk of completing the ascent were only slightly increased, or if some 
could descend independently, they would not be mutually dependent in the required way. 
 
This concludes the arguments of this paper. In defending the non-intentionalist model, I have 
accommodated central collectivities for which the intentionalist cannot adequately account. 
However, I have gone further than this. I have indicated the range of situations – many more 
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than we acknowledge – in which we are bound together into collectivities by our goals, 
purposes or fundamental interests and in which, like it or not, there is an ineliminable 
collective significance to what we do. 
There are at least two ways in which this is only a first step. Firstly, the non-intentionalist 
model could have important implications for moral and political obligations. In identifying as 
collectivities situations where we are mutual dependent for what would make each of us better 
off, it yields at least a prima facie prudential case for collective decision-making: for forming 
joint commitments, where they do not already exist, which then assign individual duties. 
Going further still, members of some collectivities might plausibly be said to owe each 
other such cooperation to achieve the common end. This might be defended by appeal to the 
fact that collective effort is required for the satisfaction, for each, of a fundamental human 
interest. It is relatively uncontroversial that we have a moral duty to cooperate to preserve 
others from great harm if we can do so at slight cost to each of us. The sacrifice of such an 
interest would constitute great harm, while precisely the mutual nature of the dependence 
would render that cost sufficiently low – indeed, each asked to cooperate to secure the interest 
should be better off doing so – so long as duties were fairly allocated to take into account other 
fundamental interests and moral ties. This, however, is the merest sketch of a highly complex 
question, to which I am attempting to do greater justice in work in progress elsewhere. 
Secondly, social scientists seeking to interpret and assess our increasingly interconnected 
lives, and philosophers trying to make sense of our duties in a fragile world, might apply the 
model to defend a “collectivity of humanity”. Our common interests in such a case would 
include environmental preservation and the avoidance of other threats of humans to humanity, 
such as nuclear war or global economic meltdown. Again, elaboration and defence of these 
points lies beyond the scope of this paper, but in highlighting them I hope to have given some 
idea of the wider debate to which it could contribute. 
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